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Abstract 
Technology explosion induced by information explosion will eventually change 
artifacts into intelligent autonomous agents consisting of surrogates and mediators 
from which humans can receive services without special training.  Four potential 
problems might arise as a result of the paradigm shift: technology abuse, 
responsibility flaw, moral in crisis, and overdependence on artifacts.  Although the 
first and second might be resolved in principle by introduction of public mediators, 
the rest seems beyond technical solution.  Under the circumstances, a reasonable 
goal might be to create a mutual dependency between empathy and technology: using 
technology to help people cultivate empathy among people so empathy in the society 
may allow people to help each other to recover from disasters beyond the scope of the 
assumption underlying the society of mediators.  I highlight an immersive 
collaborative interaction environment for helping people share first-person view and 
its application to building empathic agents. 
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1. Info-plosion and techno-plosion 
 
The digital universe is exponentially expanding.  The volume of information on the 
net has exhibited an exponential increase in the last decade.  This phenomenon is 
often called information explosion or info-plosion [Kitsuregawa 2010].  In the 
info-plosion age, the user is becoming more interested in information services brought 
about by artifacts, rather than artifacts themselves.  Info-plosion not only visualizes a 
long tail of desire that might serve as a driving-force for technology but also 
popularizes methods and tools for realizing desire.  The collective intelligence 
empowered by the information infrastructure enables agile fabrication of a solution to 
desire.  The more desire is satisfied, the more desire is generated.   
Eventually, info-plosion will result in techno-plosion, causing a paradigm shift 
from the artifacts-as-designed-tools to the artifacts-as-autonomous-agents.  In this 
paradigm, we live with autonomous agents for assistance in the living space.  They 
will serve as an integrated interface between the real and cyber world.  They will be 
able to collect the situational information around themselves through sensors and 
provide a suitable service with the user through actuators of various kinds.  They 
will hang around you and help you both reactively and proactively.  As the 
technology will realize the details, the human will not have to be a computer geek in 
order to benefit from the advanced information and service environment brought by 
intelligent autonomous agents.  From the moral points of view, the advent of 
autonomous agents may more conform to humanity, for they will allow us to 
concentrate on the end, as opposed to the means, and ultimately we will not have to 
pay much attention on the tools, or the means for the end, as autonomous agents will 
take care of all the details concerning the tools on behalf of us.   
Unfortunately, there will be four major problems underlying the naive 
implementation of intelligent autonomous agents.  The first problem is technology 
abuse.  New technologies can be applied to illegal or malicious activities.  Artifacts 
that merely act on behalf of the owner extend both the good and evil wills of the 
owner.  The advanced technology might enable an intruder to sneak into your 
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proximity without being noticed, or permit a fraud to deceive you in a novel way.  
The past experiences and knowledge might not be able to prevent damages from 
happening.  Serious problems may arise before people have become aware of them 
to take precautions [Nishida 2007b].   
The second problem is responsibility flaw.  Perrow pointed out the difficulty of 
sustaining sensibility against accidents as an organization, and accidents might 
happen even normally [Perrow 1984].  The more complex artifacts become, the less 
likely the humans can put them under control. Neither the product maker nor the 
owner of a complex artifact may take a full responsibility of an artifact, if it is fairly 
complex; the owner of the artifact cannot envision all possible outcomes caused by 
the artifacts s/he possess, for it might be simply beyond her/his intellectual 
capabilities; a product maker may not be able to make sure that the product may work 
properly under any usage scenarios.    
The third problem is moral in crisis.  In a complex and changing world, ethical 
conflicts might be caused when people have inconsistent beliefs in how the ethical 
principles are instantiated as moral rules, although people might know that ethical 
principles [Kant 1788] [Rawls 1999] [Decker 2008] are designed to protect the 
autonomy and dignity of humans and construe it as entailing the norm of protecting 
the weak from being used solely as a means to achieve an end by the strong.  People 
might not be fully aware of the consequence of her/his dominance over the weak 
[Nishida 2009a]. 
The fourth problem is overdependence on artifacts.  Introduction of 
autonomous agent will cause heavy dependence on artifacts.  Individuals might use 
artifacts without judgment.  The society might assume the infallibility of artifacts 
without rationale.  There are strong concerns about heavy dependence on artifacts.  
Among others, Cooley exhibited a similar concern using “from judgment to 
calculation” [Cooley 2007], and gave a caveat of being overly depending on 
calculation rather than judgment.  The heavy dependence will entirely remove 
motivations of thinking and imagination at the individual level, and might bring about 
“empty brains” [Maurer 2007].  Maurer warns that a serious break down of the 
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computerized social infrastructure might cause a catastrophic disaster and bring the 
human society back to the Stone Age.   
 
2. Computationally mediated society 
 
The technology abuse and responsibility flaw problem might be resolved by 
introduction of a computational framework of mediating social interactions, in which 
public mediators are introduced in addition to surrogates and private mediators to 
bring about fair distribution of resources.   
The design, implementation, and operation of public mediators are made by a 
public organization authorized in the society.  Public mediators shall be built under a 
publicly transparent process and operated under public monitoring.  Risks caused by 
public mediators may be underwritten by the public; even if the user may suffer from 
damage, it is reasonable that the public sector representing the community involving 
the user takes a responsibility to compensate for the damages caused by the mediators 
at a public cost. In contrast, private mediators may be employed at occasions when 
special conveniences are desired at the user’s own cost.   
This new framework is deemed as the world supported by “super intelligence” in 
which each human will not directly interact with each other or play social functions 
anymore; instead, people interact with each other through the public or private 
mediators.  Inter-human interaction is realized by coupling the human-agent 
communication between the owner and her/his surrogate, and the social 
communication among mediators.  Each person's intention is communicated to 
her/his surrogate in the human-agent communication.  Surrogates interact with each 
other on behalf of the owner.  Each surrogate attempts to maximize the satisfaction 
of the owner's intention, based on a specialized knowledge about how to plug-in to the 
network of mediators.  In contrast, public mediators are fabricated and maintained 
by the public sector.  Public mediators may attempt to maximize the harmony, if not 
the merit, of the society as a whole, by maximally arbitrating the requests and offering 
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from participating agents, while private mediators may work for the owner or 
institution to which it belongs.  
The computational framework of mediating social interactions appears to solve 
the technology abuse and the responsibility flaw problems.  The technology abuse 
problem will be almost solved if not complete, as people can affect other people only 
through mediators that comply with the social rules.  Their safety is guaranteed by 
the community so long as they use public mediators, as artifacts are designed to 
comply with the social rules and hence are transparent at the granularity specified by 
the social rules.  The responsibility flaw problem will be almost, if not complete, 
solved in principle in this framework, in the sense that the infrastructure is 
underwritten by the community responsible for the user.   
It should be noted, however, we should admit that even the society of public 
mediators is inherently incomplete.  First, it cannot be free from accidental 
malfunction.  Even worse, the above framework deteriorates the moral in crisis and 
overdependence on artifacts problems.  The moral in crisis problem will be 
escalated, as the surrogates will do anything on behalf of the user and as a result 
people will lose opportunities to think about morals and practice in the society.  The 
overdependence on artifact problem will become desperately serious to the degree 
unrecoverable.  It appears that we have to live with being assisted with artifacts 
[Nishida 2009b].   
Occasionally, the mankind might encounter unprecedented disasters and the 
computational framework might cease to function as an infrastructure.  That is the 
time for the mankind to depend on itself.  Under the circumstances, a reasonable 
goal might be to create a mutual dependency between empathy and technology: using 
technology to help people cultivate empathy among people so empathy in the society 
may allow people to help each other to restore the infrastructure of the civilization, 
should they suffer from disasters and breakdowns that might be caused by 
incompleteness of technology.  Substantial portion of technology should be devoted 
to help the mankind foster the sociality and moral for that time. 
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3. Empathy is the central issue 
 
Empathy has been defined as “the ability to understand others’ emotions and/or 
perspectives and, often, to resonate with others’ emotional states,” or as “an affective 
response that is identical, or very similar, to what the other person is feeling or might 
be expected to feel given the context: a response stemming from an understanding of 
another’s emotional state or condition.” [Eisenberg 2010]  Empathy can also be 
considered to be equivalent to conviviality that allows individuals to identify with 
each other thereby experiencing each other’s feelings, thoughts and attitudes, and 
hence is deemed a central concept to design a community [Caire 2009].   
Empathy is critical for people to understand and help each other to restore the 
infrastructure should there be a technology breakdown.  Empathy should also be 
established between humans and artifacts to bring about better symbiosis. 
In order to see the issues in more detail, let us consider a situation illustrated in 
Fig. 1, where a person in the right (A) talks about a difficulty and her friend (B) 
expresses a concern, a typical scene of empathy.  There may be a wide variety of 
possible causes, ranging from the physiological to the ethical.  The response of a 
friend might have come out of a mere politeness without accompanying much 
thought.  On the contrary, it might have come from concern at a much deeper level 
resulting from compassionate thoughts.  For example, B may have imagined what 
has happened from what she has heard from A and felt in the way A might have felt 
Tell me your problem
I have a problem
B A  
Figure 1: Hypothesized mechanism of empathy. 
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(Fig. 2).  In order to reach this level, one needs to sense and interpret social signals 
or subtle cues caused by a partner [Pentland 2008].  According to theory of mind 
(ToM) [Baron-Cohen 1985], people normally attribute mental states, such as desire or 
intention, to interpret and predict the behavior of other people.  In general, reasoning 
about the mental process needs to be supported by the background knowledge.  How 
can one acquire knowledge for it?   
According to the theory theory hypothesis in cognitive development [Gopnik 
2003], children develop their everyday knowledge of the world in the same way as 
adults develop scientific theories.  A computational model for this hypothesis might 
be realized with a classic framework of symbolic knowledge-based abductive 
reasoning that will maintain one or more line of defeasible explanation for the 
observed behaviors of a partner, supported by the given knowledge base (Fig. 3).  
Unfortunately, however, this approach may run into a difficulty when little evidences 





Figure 2: Imagine what has happened from what is heard.  A might have been dis-
couraged and wanted to talk with B, for she was criticized not only by colleagues but 
also by her boss.   
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The simulation theory suggests that human uses her/his own embodiment and 
mental model to simulate the behavior and mental process of the other people to 
understand them.  For example, B may want to examine each step of the story she 
guessed by replacing the image of A by herself in the story, using a model about 
herself.  B’s nervous system centered on limbic system will allow her to share 
emotional reactions similar to what A has experienced [Damasio 1994].   
Recent findings of neuroscientists suggest that mirror neurons help us 
understand the emotions of other people by some form of inner imitation.  Mirror 
neurons fire both when one performs an action and sees that action.  They were first 
found in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the macaque brain and then in the 
human brain [Rizzolatti 2008].  Gallese, Eagle, and Migone [Gallese 2007] suggest 
that intentional attunement or embodied simulation enabled by the dynamics of our 
embodiment and neural system, including mirror neurons, might cause empathy.  








Figure 3: Symbolic knowledge-based abductive reasoning. 
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other people by making some form of inner imitation to pretend to be “in other 
people’s shoes” (the mirror neuron hypothesis of empathy).   
The computational model that reflects neuroscientists’ arguments on empathy 
might be the one shown in Fig. 4.  The architecture of an individual person’s 
cognition may include an internal theater.  In addition to a routine work of human 
information processing that takes information from receptors and produces motor 
commands, the input is sent to the internal theater where what happening is 
reproduced for, e.g., reflection and planning.  The communication partner’s behavior 
is reproduced with the assistance of mirror units in the internal theater and interpreted 
by using the actor’s own mechanism for generating emotional appraisals.   
Unfortunately, the above framework does not retain all the advantages of 
symbolic knowledge-based abductive reasoning.  In particular, it does not allow for 
contrasting one interpretation against another, which is often considered useful in 









B A  
Figure 4: The computational model that reflects neuroscientists’ arguments on empathy. 
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After all, the theory and simulation theory components need to be integrated into 
a coherent mechanism as shown in Fig. 5, where the two components play 
complementary roles to each other.  The theory theory component will handle 
hypothesis making and reasoning at the cognitive level, while the simulation theory 
components carry out simulation with imaginary embodiment and emotions to 
evaluate hypotheses.  The theory theory component guides and controls the 
simulation theory components, while the latter provides information about the 
appraisal of the given hypothesis based on the agent’s own embodiment and 
physiology.   
 
4. The blocking factors and sharing hypothesis 
 
Even though people are gifted with a native mechanism for empathy, empathy may 
still not result due to blocking factors.   
First, the universe of discourse may have not been shared between the 
participants, preventing one from figuring out what has happened to the partner.  
Establishing the shared universe of discourse is not always trivial.  When the 
participants are talking over the phone, for example, it is often difficult for them to 




B A  
Figure 5: An integrated model for empathy. 
 11 / 27 
 
verbal description or because they cannot share the environment to which they may 
refer to communicate their thoughts.  Even in face-to-face conversation where the 
environment of conversation is shared, the participants may have difficulty in 
interpreting what is said about objects or events due to the lack of shared background.   
Second, empathy might be blocked due to the failure in sharing first-person view 
with other people.  It may prevent one from perceiving the universe of discourse 
from different perspectives and resolve conflicts caused by the discrepancy of the 
perceived universe.  For example, you might not be able to feel how small children 
experience with the world unless you look at the world at the same altitude as their 
eyes; you might not understand the difficulty of people who lost sight until you try to 
move around in a hazard with your eyes closed.   
Third, inferior knowledge or skill level might not allow one to interpret the 
meaning in the same way with an expert.  Although one may enjoy the play by a 
professional, s/he might not able to perceive or be aware of events that make sense to 
experts nor affect the world in the way experts do.   
Fourth, empathy may be distracted by the differences in communication style, or 
the way intentions are encoded into social signals ranging from the way how verbal 
and nonverbal signals are coordinated make up an utterance, to the way the discourse 
is structured to satisfy the speaker’s intention.  Unlike behaviors whose meaning can 
be inferred on the anthropological or ethological grounds, the meaning of rituals 
[Goffman 1967] cannot be understood without being taught by a member in the 
community because they have resulted from arbitrariness the community has chosen 
from multiple choices.  Failure in sharing communication style and rituals will not 
allow one to exchange clearly defined messages with the communication partners, 
and predict how other agents may behave in a given communication environment, 
resulting in blocking empathy.  Mishap might be observed in intercultural 
communication where social signals generated by the speaker are interpreted by the 
hearer in a different way, which might cause double bind and distress of the hearer. 
Finally, empathy may not be induced if there is a discrepancy in the way the 
value is determined for events and objects.  According to cognitive appraisal theory 
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[Ortony 1988], emotion is determined by evaluation of incoming events according to 
the value system.  At higher levels of the mental process, the value system is used to 
make decisions.  Empathy might not be obtained unless the observed behaviors do 
not follow the value system believed or at least approved by the observer.   
It appears that the more technology removes those blocking factors and the more 
is shared among the participants, the more empathy is gained (the sharing hypothesis: 
[Nishida 2011]).   Information and communication technologies have a large 
potential for bringing about various kinds of sharing that have not existed before the 
information age.  The internet and web technologies have brought about significant 
impacts on helping people share the universe of discourse, first-person view, 
knowledge and skills, the communication style and rituals, and the value system.  
The sharing hypothesis emphasizes the potentials that technology may realize in the 
future, rather than enumerating a list of blocking factors.  Indeed, we have a long list 
of challenges.  In the rest of this essay, I will highlight an immersive collaborative 
interaction environment for helping people share first-person view to bring about 
empathy and its application to building empathic agents.  
 
5. An immersive collaborative interaction environment for scaffolding the 
first-person view 
 
The first-person view allows for looking at the world from the perspective of other 
people.  In order to comprehend their mental processes, one needs to share not only 
the first-person view like a life-log, but also a view surrounding them and the options 
available for them.   
An immersive interaction environment as shown in Fig. 6 may partly satisfy the 
above mentioned requirements, for it permits one to experience a first-person view at 
a remote place to feel as if s/he were there.  The remote cylindrical surface, called a 
bubble, provides the user with the audio-visual scene around her/him, allowing 
her/him to virtually occupy there to collect signals around her/him.  One may attach 
an omnidirectional camera and microphones to a mobile robot that moves around the 
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physical environment, or virtually embed the bubble into a shared virtual space, as 
augmented virtuality [Milgram 1999] shown in Fig. 7.  It will permit one to create 
and share the universe of discourse beyond spatial and temporal constraints.   
ICIE (Immersive Collaborative Interaction Environment) [Ohmoto 2011] is an 
implementation of the above idea.  The current version of ICIE employs eight 
64-inch dis-play panels arranged in a circle with about 2.5 meters diameter.  Eight 
surround speakers are used to reproduce the acoustic environment.  The ICIE can be 
connected to a remote audio-visual capture (AVC) device so that the user in the 
immersive environment can feel as if s/he were standing at the place the AVC device 
is located.   
The audio-visual scene at a remote place can be projected into the ICIE screen in 
either online or offline.  In the online mode, scenes captured by one or more CCD 
camera or even omnidirectional camera possibly attached to a mobile vehicle can be 
projected on the screen on the fly.  It will produce a real-time immersive image as if 
the user in ICIE were moving around the remote place.  A tele-presence environment 
using ICIE will help one dwell [Polanyi 1966], if not completely, in the mind of an 





Figure 6: Projecting a remote omnidirectional view to an immersive display. 
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In the offline mode, we have developed a method for reconstructing a virtual 
space consisting of panoramic images for a given area of the real world, by combining 
multiple computer-vision techniques such as structure from motion, multi view stereo, 
and depth map [Mori 2011].  As the user virtually walks around the given space, a 
panoramic image for the location is computed almost in real time.  The current 
version can automatically reconstruct from approximately 1200 digital photos a 3D 
scene for a 20m x 20m space in 4 days (Fig. 8).  It will help the user formulate an 
embodied image of the target place and familiarize her/himself there, which might 
help her/him share spatial cognition of the target place for empathic communication.   
Recently, Masaharu Yano has prototyped a portable 3D multi-party conversation 
recording environment [Yano 2012].  It integrates static recording of environment 
and 3D recording using multiple range sensors.  It not only allows for 
re-constructing a 3D movie for multi-party conversation but also tracking a 
first-person view moving with a given actor (Fig. 9), which permits one to understand 
how other people may observe the world from a given perspective (virtualized reality 
[Kanade 1995]).  Work is in progress on real time mapping of the first-person view 
on the immersive display of ICIE.   
The shared virtual space
 
Figure 7: Interacting bubbles in the shared virtual space. 
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ICIE can be used as an interface for a virtual space.  We are building a system 
called simulated crowd [Thovuttikul 2011], which is based on the idea of synthetic 
culture, i.e., “role profiles for enacting dimensions of national culture” [Hofstede 
2002].  Simulated crowd allows people to practice culture-specific nonverbal 
communication behaviors.  A simulated crowd can be characterized as a possible 
 
Figure 9. The 3D scene at the lower-right was reproduced by integrating scenes 
captured by three range sensors  
(two scenes on the upper half and one at the lower-left). 
 
Figure 8. The user walks around a virtual space corresponding to a place of 20m x 
20m in our university campus. 
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instantiation of synthetic culture, which specifies an artificial environment habited by 
synthetic agents behaving according to a parameterized norm.  Simulated crowd 
allows the user to virtually walk in a crowd of a given culture as a form of mental 
programs [Hofstede 2001] to experience culture-specific non-verbal signals by which 
people cooperate or negotiate with each other to avoid collision and achieve the 
respective goals [Lala 2011c] (Fig. 10).  We have found that the different settings of 
values for generic parameters may influence not only the physical characteristics of 
the place (such as average travel time or wait time in the space) [Lala 2011b] but also 
cultural interpretations by the user [Lala 2011a].  The major future challenge 
involves intelligent tele-presence that can mediate the communication between the 
user and remote participants by semi-autonomously navigating the user’s avatar and 
interpreting the situation at the remote conversational field for the user (e.g., language 
translation, annotating social cues, etc).   
In summary, ICIE extends the way people share the first-person view.  It allows 
them to look at the world from other perspectives, contributing to the increase of 
opportunities of sharing and, hence, empathy.   
 
6. Empathic agents 
 
An empathic agent is defined as an autonomous agent that can create and maintain 
empathy with people.  Empathy between humans and artifacts is a key to build 
human-artifact symbiosis when we are surrounded by an unlimited number of 
autonomous artifacts in a computationally mediated society.  Once completed, 
empathic agents as a surrogate will not only efficiently and securely understand our 
 
Figure 10. The user interacting with a virtual crowd. 
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intentions to provide with maximal service as our fellow surrogate but also motivate 
humans to understand the incompleteness of autonomous agents.  It should be noted 
that empathic agents have not been introduced to directly resolve the moral-in-crisis 
or overdependence on artifacts problem, even though I believe that empathic agents 
may indirectly contribute to those issues.   
Building an empathic agent has been deemed as one of the most challenging 
problems in AI, for it involves reproduction of a substantial portion of a mental 
process of humans.  From the perspective of the sharing hypothesis, the 
developments in AI can be characterized as long standing efforts on building 
autonomous agents that can share, if not comprehensive, meaning and intellectual 
functions with people. 
SHRDLU [Winograd 1972] was an early natural language understanding system 
for a “block” world.  The user can use English to tell SHRDLU how the block world 
should be changed.  Given an input TTY-type utterance from the user, SHRDLU 
will figure out the meaning of the utterance by referring to linguistic knowledge 
concerning syntax, semantics and discourse, and invoke a planning system in search 
for a plan for achieving the given goal.  Thus, SHRDLU allowed the universe of 
discourse to be shared with the user, based on linguistic and task knowledge.   
Another natural language dialogue system developed earlier than SHRDLU was 
Eliza [Weizenbaum 1966] Although Eliza did not understand the input in an ordinary 
sense, it invoked strong empathic reactions.  The major reason was because 
Weizenbaum programmed Eliza in such a way that a standard TTY-based 
communication style was shared with the user.   
Sharing communication style and rituals appears to induce empathy, as pointed 
out in the arguments for believable agents [Bates 1994] and the virtual theater 
[Hayes-Roth 1998].  Nonverbal expressions encompassing facial expressions, bodily 
expressions, and paralinguistic expressions are considered to be critical factors to play 
a critical role in demonstrating lifelikeness and personality.  Nonverbal expressions 
are widely incorporated in embodied conversational agents [Cassell 2000; Prendinger 
2004; Nishida 2007a]. 
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Emotional expressions such as pleasure and pain might be universal in humans 
and animals, as pointed out by Darwin [Darwin 1872], and hence deemed to be 
indispensable in the definition of empathy.  Even a simple machinery may give a 
strong emotional influence to humans [Breitenberg 1984].  Based on [Damasio 
1994], Pickard suggested a computational architecture with primary and secondary 
emotions.  The lower level processing is based on signal and pattern information 
processing, while the upper level employs reasoning and decision making to interface 
conceptual information representation with emotional behaviors [Pickard 1997].    
An integrated system FAtiMA-PSI was proposed which allows the user to 
experience with the first-person view of a specified character in interactive dramas 
[Aylett 2012].  FAtiMA-PSI includes a mechanism for modeling other agents and 
their relationship to the individual agent, which is able to build and update a record of 
the motivational state of other agents according to events perceived.  Symbols, 
rituals, and appraisal are used to represent cultural aspects. 
Unfortunately, those attempts have several severe limitations in establishing 
empathy with humans.  First, conventional autonomous agents cannot become 
significantly smarter by being taught to meet new demands for sharing.  Even 
though some adaptive learning mechanisms allow them to improve their performance, 
they do not contribute to acquiring intelligent/communication functions.  In contrast, 
humans (after a certain age) are very efficient in extending a repertoire of their 
intellectual skills by simply being taught.  Second, the conventional autonomous 
agents cannot rely on their own embodiment and physiology to interpret the internal 
state of the communication partner in novel situations.  In contrast, humans can 
handle novel situations with the assistance of their embodiment and physiological 
mechanism. 
In the next section, we will discuss the first issue, while we discuss the second 
issue as a future problem in Section 8. 
 
7. Teaching by indwelling and learning by mimicking for sharing 
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According to the sharing hypothesis, an autonomous agent needs to effectively 
acquire what is required to be shared for empathy.  Although the most effective 
transfer of knowledge among humans is teaching, autonomous agents are not easy to 
teach.  What hinders teaching appears to be caused by failure in sharing first-person 
view between the human teacher and the agent learner, as the human teacher cannot 
successfully grasp how the agent learner curves the world and what it needs to learn 
from the teacher.  In this section, I discuss how ICIE introduced in Section 5 can be 
integrated with a learning-by-mimicking engine to allow for effective agent learning 
from the human-assisted interaction, which we believe is effective in acquiring tacit 
knowledge [Polanyi 1966]. 
Our immersive Wizard of Oz (WOZ) environment on ICIE allows human’s 
expertise to be transferred to robots in the situated fashion.  ICIE allows the human 
operator to feel as if s/he stayed inside a robot, so that s/he can choose the most 
plausible communication behavior under the circumstances.  At the same time, the 
immersive WOZ environment captures the WOZ operator’s behavior in real time 
using multiple infrared range sensors, and maps it on the remote robot (Fig. 11).  













Figure 11: The immersive Wizard of Oz environment on ICIE. 
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the remote robot to produce utterances (with a modulation, when necessary) [Ohashi 
2010]. 
The behavioral model of the robot is inferred from the collected data through 
four stages of learning [Mohammad 2009, Mohammad 2010].  At the discovery 
stage, the basic actions and commands will be discovered.  At the association stage, 
a probabilistic model will be generated to specify the likelihood of the occurrence of 
observed actions as a result of observed commands.  Granger causality is used to 
discover natural delay.  At the controller generation stage, the behavioral model will 
be converted into an actual controller to allow the robotic agent to act in similar 
situations.  Finally, the gestures and actions learned from multiple sessions will be 
combined into a single model at the accumulation stage (Fig. 12). 
In order to handle mental processes at higher levels, we need to address how 
much one could help the user formulate a preference structure on an unfamiliar 
subject by repeating interviews consisting of presentation of possible choices and 
asking for the preference [Ohmoto 2010].  Incomplete verbal responses and 
measurement of body movement and physiological indices (SCR and LF/HF) are 
 
 
Figure 12. A framework for learning by imitation [Mohammad 2009]. 
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integrated to estimate the ordered set of features the user emphasized during each 
interview.  We take into account that the user’s preference structure may change as 
s/he changes emphasized feature.  Preliminary experiments suggest that our method 
can track the user’s changing emphasis and often result in user’s satisfaction.  A 
further experiment [Ohmoto 2011] suggests that critical changes of features 
emphasized by the user can be detected by the combination of incomplete verbal 
reactions, body movements, and physiological indices.   
It should be noted that I do not intend to claim that technologies presented in this 
section or those in Section 6 have proved advantages over the previous system.  
Instead, I have overviewed them in order to show how technology might contribute to 
cultivating emotions among people or realizing empathic agents. 
 
8. Future Perspectives 
 
The most challenging issue in realizing empathic agents would be sharing 
embodiment and emotions.  Although we know that certain techniques may increase 
believability, or suspension of disbelief [Bates 1994] due to intentional stance 
[Dennet 1987] or the media equation [Reeves 1996], it appears that we need not only 
scratch the surface but also seek a way for elaborating the complex link between 
embodiment, emotion, and rationality.   
A potential approach to resolving the discrepancy in embodiment between 
humans and artifacts appears to consist in simulation and metaphor.  On the one 
hand, we might use physiological/mental simulations to reproduce the mental process 
at some levels of representation abstracted from the neuro-physiological levels.  On 
the other hand, we might attempt to alleviate the discrepancy with the power of strong 
metaphor [Lakoff 1980] so that shared metaphor should allow one concept to be 
represented by understanding of another concept, bridging over significant disparity 
in embodiment of humans and artifacts.  We might depend on metaphor to project 
the embodiment and emotion of the human to the empathic agent and vice versa.  
Although the empathy between human and agent might be weaker than the empathy 
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among people, the sharing hypothesis suggests that it would be much better than 
nothing.   
In order to make a steady progress, we need to establish a methodology of 
evaluation by introducing an appropriate set of indices that can somehow measure 
how much empathy is cultivated as a result of a given technology.  A full scale 
evaluation shall follow once such indices have been figured out even partially.   
 
9. Concluding remarks 
 
In the former half of this essay, I have argued why technology will have to depend on 
empathy.  First, I have pointed out that we will eventually live with super 
intelligence consisting of mediated autonomous agents as a result of techno-plosion 
brought about by info-plosion.  Although a framework of computationally mediated 
autonomous agents appears to be an asymptotic goal of symbiosis between humans 
and artifacts, two problems will not be resolved: moral in crisis and overdependence 
on artifacts.  In order to cope with this innate incompleteness of super intelligence, 
we need to foster empathy in the mankind to create mutual dependency between 
empathy and technology.   
In the latter half of this essay, I have discussed how technology may cultivate 
empathy among people.  Following the discussion on empathy from computational 
points of view, I have introduced the sharing hypothesis, suggesting that empathy 
might be achieved by increasing what is shared.  I have overviewed how an 
immersive collaborative interaction environment helps one experience situations from 
different perspectives. 
Empathic agents are critical in realizing symbiosis between humans and 
artifacts.  I have discussed empathic agents from the viewpoint of the sharing 
hypothesis.  AI research can be seen as a history of unceasing efforts on realizing 
artifacts that can symbolically share with us perception, language, conceptualization, 
and knowledge, if not completely, by means of pattern recognition, natural language 
 23 / 27 
 
understanding and generation, knowledge representation and reasoning, and 
knowledge-based system.   
A couple of challenges have been addressed to build empathic agents:  Making 
agents teachable and overcoming the discrepancy in embodiment and physiology.  I 
have introduced the teaching-by-indwelling and learning-by-mimicking framework 
using an immersive collaborative interaction environment.   
Introduction of a powerful mechanism of metaphor might be a key to overcome 
difference in embodiment and physiology.  A potential future direction for empathic 
agents is to build a sophisticated human simulator encompassing embodiment and 
emotion and to embed an elaborate theory of metaphor for sharing between humans 
and artifacts.   
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